Abstract: The bureaucracy continues to exist in the post-industrial society. Contrary to many predictions, the scope of its activities and its impact on management in the society increase. Innovation bureaucracy emerges. It is associated with the innovation management. The article describes in detail the increasing role of bureaucracy in modern Russian social and economic conditions. The objective causes of the situation are: routines in the organization of the innovation process, the need of the bureaucracy in the implementation of large-scale projects etc. While working with innovation, the bureaucracy retains its nature, and tries to substitute genuine creativity by multitude bureaucratic procedures, the invention of which constitutes its substance. In particular, such a situation occurs when computers and the Internet are used in public and private organizations.

Keywords: bureaucracy; innovation; routine; instructions; projects; computer; Internet.

Introduction

Bureaucracy has many faces. It has been around for millennia and, for obvious reasons, it could not stay unchanged. The phenomenon of bureaucracy is much older than the theories of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy became subject to economic and sociological research only in XIX Century. And, naturally, the most prominent figure in this field of research is Max Weber, who was the first to propose a complete concept of bureaucracy and who pronounced it the ideal of public administration.

Max Weber's own concept of bureaucracy is far from complete. His sudden death from influenza interrupted his creative plans. As a result, we now have two disjointed fragments from his intended book, Economy and Society. These fragments, published 25 years after the author's death, consist of a few pages with no logical conclusion. Only institutional and historical context of writing of these fragments can give us a hint of the author's main ideas. This context is as follows: on the verge of XIX-XX C., traditional forms of government (absolute monarchies exemplified by Romanovs and Habsburgs) were crumbling and showing their obvious inefficiency. Charismatic leaders who came into power as a result of revolutions (starting with the French Revolution) prove themselves equally inefficient. Only the stable mechanisms of public administration formed in capitalist states and corporations demonstrated real ability to achieve their goals and organize the efforts of thousands and millions of people. Many elements in Weber's account of bureaucracy we associate today with [legal state] and not with bureaucracy per se. He strongly opposed the influence of informal relationships (characteristic for kings and tzars) on administrative decisions, and the abuse of power unchecked by any formal rules or laws (characteristic for monarchs and populist leaders alike). Bureaucracy, in his mind, was free from these shortcomings and therefore could be considered an "ideal" form of government.

Anyway, Weber formulated the generally-known features of bureaucracy and singled it out as the most important phenomenon in industrial-age organizations (Weber, 1978, p. 956-1006).

In 1960s-70s Aston experiments (2) performed by British scientists widened our image of bureaucracy (Pugh, 1988). Their main achievement was the recognition of many forms of bureaucracy. They singled out, alongside the classic, full bureaucracy and non-bureaucratic forms of organization, the personal and the industrial bureaucracy, and highlighted the various factors underlying this administrative phenomenon, such as the importance of the building structure factor in industrial bureaucracy. Strict
regimentation of each action defined the rigid bureaucratic structure of organizations, which used conveyor belts or similar technologies. Both the ordinary workers and the administrators fall under this regimentation. Personal bureaucracy, however, is based on a completely different basic principle: the centralization of power. This type of bureaucracy occurs in public administration where it is impossible to foresee and regulate all the possible future situations on a designated territory, so the clear chain of command and firm subordination of all links create the basis for efficiency of the whole system of governance. These ideas were further developed by H. Minzenberg (1992) who separated 'mechanical' and professional' bureaucracy.

Aside from this, the last 150 years have seen the rise of huge corporations that took the key roles not just in economy but in the society as a whole. These corporations developed their own, unique style of bureaucracy, which led to the separation of government and corporate bureaucracy. They share many features, as pointed out by Max Weber, but they also have significant differences the "bureaucratic help" for entrepreneurs don't share with their counterparts in public administrations. In addition, the main difference lies not in the obvious for-profit orientation of corporate bureaucracy and the non-profit government service; it is the members' attitude towards their freedoms and allowances, the stability of employment, the specifics of control procedures etc.

The development of post-industrial society inevitably left its mark on the features of modern bureaucracy. Towards the end of the industrial age the term 'bureaucracy' has acquired almost exclusively negative connotations and has come to be seen more as a disease than a form of public administration.

This negative view of bureaucracy has not just firmly lodged itself in public opinion but also associated with one of the most relevant social problems: corruption. According to representative data from Levada-Center, in 2017 corruption was 4th most important social problem that concerned people personally in contemporary Russia (33% of respondents), coming behind rising prices on consumer goods (61%), poverty (45%), and unemployment (33%)¹. The overwhelming majority of Russians (89%) see

This survey took place between 18-22 August 2017 and was conducted throughout all of Russia in both urban and rural settings. The survey was carried out among 1600 people over the age of 18 in 137 localities of 48 of the country’s regions.
corruption in public administration as unacceptable, but admit that is a somewhat pathological but vital institution in Russia. 20% of Russians allow using bribery to solve personal everyday problems. Most often respondents resorted to bribery in cases of traffic violations, when getting a driver's license, in hospitals and to get one's child into a better school\(^2\).

Russia has an admittedly inflated bureaucratic public administration. According to official Rosstat data, in the end of 2016 there was 1 087 286 government officials in Russia\(^3\); the numbers from independent sources are much bigger (for comparison, according to USSR's Central Bureau of Statistic, the number of government officials in USSR (not including party apparatus) peaked in 1985 at 2.03 million (Sokolov, Terentyev) it is perceived as wring, ineffective but working system of public administration. Meanwhile, the attempts to cut the number of government officials in Russia have often led to paradoxical results: according to the data from the Chamber of Accounts, as a result of the Government Decree to reduce the number of government officials in 2016 by 10% the actual reduction of the number by 5.6% was achieved mostly by cutting the lowest-level employees, while getting even more managers - 21% more deputy heads of federal units, 18% more directors, 13% more heads of departments.\(^4\) As mentioned before, what the general public and the officials themselves are concerned with the most is not the cumbersome and ineffective apparatus and "over-bureaucratization" but pervasive corruption and links to organized crime (11.6 and 25.3% accordingly among general public; 7.0 and 24.1% among government officials) (Gorshkov, Petukhov, et. al., 2005, p.13).

**The origins of innovation bureaucracy**

The type of bureaucracy we call 'innovation bureaucracy' emerged in the post-industrial age. Its roots can be found, first and foremost, in the dominant progressivist ideology. Such words as 'progress', 'development', 'change', 'reform', 'innovation' have become a staple of the descriptions of

This survey took place between 2-6 March 2017 and was conducted throughout all of Russia in both urban and rural settings. The survey was carried out among 1600 people over the age of 18 in 137 localities of 48 of the country's regions.

\(^3\) Federal State Statistic Service. Number of public and civil servants 01.10.2016  

today's life. These terms are routinely used in self-presentation of contemporary society presented by the intellectual and governmental elites. Despite multiple critiques of this state of affairs by postmodern branch of social thought, the stereotype of our time as the time of rapid scientific, technical and social progress has a firm hold on our minds and even hearts (Barkov, 2016). The belief in a better tomorrow is indeed very seductive. Supporting this belief are multitudinous innovations claiming to make us happier than ever before. This feel has become so unanimous and stable that in today's situation it is virtually impossible to publicly stand for stability (perceived as 'stagnation'), a return to the good old days (pejoratively labelled 'retrograde') and scepticism towards innovations (that is, of course, 'obscurantism' and 'ignorance').

Bureaucracy has long been perceived as /the/ pillar of stability and conservatism. In fact, the main objection to bureaucracy was its incapability to react to change fast enough, its tendency to slow down progress and raise unreasonable complications for any innovative activity. Contemporary bureaucracy has risen to the challenge: it did everything in its power to enter the brave new world with its fetishization of change and unwavering belief in progress.

The middle of XXth Century provided necessary conditions for such an adaptation. The world-changing inventions of the time were of the large-scale variety. Their practical realization required organized efforts of huge groups of people. Talented loners could not introduce innovative ideas into practice on their own anymore. Soviet nuclear programs, space projects and many other innovations, including the digital revolution, required the efforts of thousands, sometimes millions of people. In this process innovation, bureaucracy found its objective grounds for growth.

Even today, there are people who insist that all important inventions are made by singular minds and companies and governments only usurp the products of individual talents and feed off them. The real social-economic practice begs to differ.

A layman's view of technical progress as a product of individual genius does not stand up to criticism. In particular, innovations in IT industry were made possible by outstanding researchers and large corporations with bureaucratic structures, which put together teams of "nameless" engineers. Without the required infrastructure, supplanted by, among other things, government and corporate bureaucracy, the efforts of lone geniuses are mostly ineffective. "Sometimes innovations are viewed as a sum of hundreds of minuscule achievements, such as counters and punchcard readers. In places like IBM, aimed at everyday improvements
enacted by a team of engineers, the making of innovations is the most visible". (Barkov, 2016, p.54)

Today we can appreciate that the Soviet nuclear project was successful not only thanks to the genius of Igor Vaisilievich Kurchatov and his colleagues. The most crucial role in this innovation was played by Lavrentij Beria who led the special committee under the USSR Cabinet and who plugged the immensely powerful Soviet bureaucratic machine, and first of all the Ministry of the Interior, into the innovative project. Nevertheless, Beria never was and never claimed to be an innovator; he was a bureaucrat, body and soul.

Considering all this, the real history of XXth Century reflects the fact that bureaucracy and innovation are not so incompatible after all. Their incompatibility is more of a theoretical myth created by critics of bureaucracy by absolutizing its select features.

In the field of economic theory, the objective basis for the formation of innovation bureaucracy was best formulated by neo-institutionalism. Representatives of the evolutionary branch of this methodology of analysis highlighted routines as the most important elements of the functioning of organizations. The term 'routine' may be equivocal and sometimes is conflated with such concepts as 'algorithm', 'habit', or 'skill'. The authors, who coined this term, when describing routines, used riding a bicycle as an example. It is a skill which can not be learned from books. It is learned by practicing it in real life and thereby gets ingrained not only in the consciousness but also in the unconscious memory.

The main discovery of R.R. Nelson and C.G. Winter was that innovation activity in organizations also proceeds by routines or includes routines as its necessary element. Firstly, a familiar routine that was practiced for many years can serve as a perfect basis for something new. One just needs to make a new combination of existing routines. Secondly, there is no such innovation that would change an organization completely, especially if the organization is a big one. There always are some elements of the past that prove useful in a new situation. "In some parts the innovative routine can be based on physical principles that have only recently been discovered and now are enacted in new types of equipment and skills; but this new core can be surrounded by numerous supplementary activities governed by the same routines which have been in place for many years" (Nelson, & Winter, 1982, p.182). Thirdly and finally, the search for new solution follows some routines too. An organization always accumulates experience, not only in recurring operations, but in acting in uncertain conditions, in searching for new ways if the old ones stop working. "Routinized innovative or problem-
solving activities come in various forms, among which there are some well-known features of the organizational picture. If there is a problem to be solved, one can delegate it to a subordinate to research, or form a committee or a workshop, or call in a consultant with a good reputation" (Nelson, & Winter, 1982, pp.183-184).

There is a special repertoire of routines that come in handy for the company employees when the director proclaims "Think of something new!"

This theory leads to an important conclusion: the innovative activity can be, under certain circumstances, routinized. People in general are resistant to breaking the previously effective pattern of behavior. And where there are routines, there is bureaucracy. In fact, Nelson and Winter have provided theoretical basis for the existence of innovation bureaucracy. It is the bureaucracy that is charged with coming up with and keeping of routines for searching for the new. In this case theory did not contradict the practice, and in corporations and government structures alike emerged thousands of innovation bureaucrats who can not live without managing innovations. However, there is one major discrepancy between theory and practice. If in theory the existence of such a bureaucracy is justified and largely effective, in reality innovative bureaucrats retain and even amplify the negative qualities of their predecessors. The ordinary workers and citizens are usually indifferent to who they are suffering from or inconvenienced by: traditional or innovation bureaucrats.

All of the above are the reasons for bureaucracy's continuous existence under current social conditions. But what are the specific features of modern bureaucracy? Why can it be rightfully called 'innovation bureaucracy'? Surprisingly, the answer to these questions is relatively simple and refers to the everyday activities of modern-day bureaucrats.

**Features of innovation bureaucracy (a Russia-based study)**

Originally, bureaucracy existed to govern the recurring processes. It was a perfect "process manager", usually overseeing a specific territory. Bureaucratic structures were very effective at distributing resources (even very limited), keeping bosses in check and generally making people's lives predictable.

But why then pay them bonuses? Initially the sentiment was that bureaucrats are commended for meticulous adherence to the rules. These kinds of bonuses were widely practiced in Russia in the form of "thirteenth salary". This traditional bonus was performance-based and usually was paid
to the government official if nothing happened in their assigned area, if everything was in order and all the elements of the governed system functioned according to plan and according to established rules. If something unusual happened, the bonus was taken away.

This system existed for years. But there has always been something dubious about it. It struggled to accommodate commendations for innovation. For some time it had been acceptable, but when post-industrial age rolled in with its belief in progress and innovation, the situation changed radically. These days, every official in managerial position at the end of the year is concerned with more than just the "audit" of the year's work; (s)he asks their employees more and more questions like "What did you do new? What new ways have you proposed?" This seemingly innocuous question gave rise to innovation bureaucracy.

Bureaucrats, with their tendency to stick to the orders, threw themselves at producing novelties because that's what got them their bonuses. "Innovating: has become one of the most significant and labor-intensive of bureaucratic activities. Most importantly, this activity found its place on almost every level of organizational hierarchy. A few major innovations begotten by top officials spawn myriads of smaller innovations in middle and low levels of management. Innovations need to be adapted to a specific object of governance; it requires a series of "innovations" for disrupting the status-quo, and so on and so forth. Oh, how many instructions need to be written in order to implement a single innovation!

In this case a relevant example is provided by transition of Russian system pf public government services into digital format. A great idea: it was supposed to make the communication between the people and the government offices easier and simpler by using new information and communication technologies. In reality, it turned into incessant proliferation of websites, portals, apps, patches and add-ons. The process of digitalization of government services led to growing budget spending on federal and regional agencies, all without any measurable "social effect" on the lives of the majority of ordinary Russians. Federal and regional portals were created, officials report growing numbers of users, and bonuses are awarded left and right for development and improvement of the portals. For example, according to Deputy Minister for Communications and Mass Media A. Kozyerv, on November 2017 more than 60 million people used the government services portal gosuslugi.ru. Traffic on the portal reached 70
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millon visits a month. This number doubled in a year\textsuperscript{5}. But the majority of services are only partially digitized, and people still have to submit the documents in person. This leads to doubling of functions: now we have to spend time on an electronic application and then submit the documents on paper. According to statistics by Rosstat, government service portals (like gosuslugi.ru) are used by Russians mostly as information resources (66.8% of operations were just searches for information, 50.6% - booking visits, 35.9% - payments of fees and fines, 27% users downloaded standard document forms)\textsuperscript{6}. 

Also, going back to the topic of doubling of innovations on all levels of organizational hierarchies, it should be noted that the creation of federal government services portal was doubled by the creation of similar portals in all federal subjects. Since 2016 government spends extra money on adaptation of software to enable transactions between various federal, departmental, regional and municipal portals.

Old bureaucratic tricks and methods were adapted for innovation activities. Today the innovations get the most attention on meetings and briefings, they are the topic of innumerable committees and commissions, countless reports on implementation, and each process is monitored with a particular eye for innovative development.

A representative example in this regard is the modernization of higher education in Russian Federation. On September 1st 2011 Federal Government Education Standards (FGES) 3 were enacted. The Education Act of Russian Federation №273 from 29.12.2012 made it necessary to change FGES 3 and to draw up a new edition of federal standard, known as FGES 3+. Today, accounting for the new professional standards, FGES 3++ is being enacted. Simultaneously, a concept of fourth-generation Standard is under review. In spite of common aspiration for more flexible system of higher education and framework standards, higher education institutions live under constant modernization of curriculums and

\textsuperscript{5} A. Kozyrev's performance at the TAdviser SummiIT conference on November 29, 2017, Moscow
\textsuperscript{6} Data of the TADVISER portal. State. Business. IT. 2017. – URL: http://www.tadviser.ru/index.php/%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8F-%D0%95%D0%B4%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B9-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B0-%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%83%D0%B3-%D0%B8-%D0%B2%BD%D0%B0%D1%8B-%D1%85-%D1%81%D0%BB%D1%83%D0%B3-%D1%80%9F%D0%A3%D0%A3%D0%A3

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modification of disciplines. Problems with current reporting pile up, causing problems with regular accreditation of educational programs. Meanwhile, the innovations require creation of permanent committees both on inter-university level and inside institutions for constant reworking of local acts, regulations and procedures.

Bureaucrats come to be evaluated not as responsible workers who keep their respective areas as uneventful as possible but as constant reformers. Age-old criteria of evaluation are replaced by surrealistic indexes of innovative ardor. The amount of proposed and implemented "new" has become one of the basic criteria for various managerial performance ratings. The "innovative" rating instrument itself was warmly welcomed by innovation bureaucracy because it allowed the proliferation of innumerable small innovations with regard to clarification of the rating factors, evaluation of these factors, involvement of experts and constant correction of their content.

A bureaucrat who was unable to create an "innovative" image is doomed for oblivion, constant criticism, stunted career path and, most importantly, no bonuses.

While we are still in the area of education, it is to be noted that today, for example, the faculty administration in universities is evaluated by adherence to performance benchmarks and the so-called "Roadmap". These indexes decide the zone (green, yellow, red) it falls in, and, consequently, the amount of money it gets from the budget and the premiums. Say, in Lomonosov Moscow State University (MSU) the performance benchmarks include several indexes directly connected to development and implementation of innovations: the amount of extra-budget money acquired through grants and patents per one faculty member; number of papers published in journals listed in Web of Science and RSCI, adjusted for the number of co-authors and the number of faculty members (of course, all these indexes are quantitative, i.e. say nothing about the quality of publications).

Human nature is, in spite of many proclamations to the contrary, extremely susceptible to money incentives. Fetishization of innovations and changes on its own probably would not change the centuries-old nature of bureaucracy as drastically. But this fetishization had a direct impact of motivation and material incentives offered to government and corporate officials.

Active stimulation of innovative activities cannot proceed without distribution of money for implementation. It is not enough to suggest a new idea and be commended for it; it is more important to implement this new
idea. And the latter is impossible without a budget. Going back to the Russian experience of digitalization of public services, we can see that the lion's share of billions in budget money goes to creation and development of government information systems that government agencies use to fulfill their offices and perform their designated services. The ratio of innovation part (R&D budget) and recurrent part (operating costs budget) in IT departments of agencies is, on an average, 30/70. According to the Ministry of Communications, the net amount of money in the plans for informatization of federal government agencies in 2016 was 109.6 billion rubles\textsuperscript{7}. Net R&D budget (i.e. the amount of money spent for creation, development or modernization of information systems or components of telecommunication networks for government offices) reached 33.8 billion rubles (31.8%). Meanwhile, the promised raise in effectivity and quality of public services and budget savings through new technologies are nowhere to be seen. For example, the developed united data transfer system was supposed to save an average of 10% in budget money. But several government departments which switched to the united system in 2016 rejected it in 2017 having seen no difference.

When a budget for innovations is allocated, there is an irresistible bureaucratic call to "develop" it. As was stated earlier, an innovation budget can include such routine items as research, development of concepts and strategies, legal support and so on. In such a case, a bureaucrat has significant sums in his/her hands. The spending of these resources has no direct result, but, for obvious reasons, it is impossible to implement innovations without it. The main imperative in this case is the "bureaucratically correct" spending. To avoid overspending and corruption charges innovation bureaucracy invents various documents seemingly supporting validity of the spending. This is why reporting on any government grant, even a small one, is excruciating.

Speaking of scientific reports, there is a significant difference between foundations and government resources allocated directly to organizations (what is commonly known as 'state assignment'). Reporting to a Russian scientific foundation (such as RFBR) is no big deal if the project itself was no sham. On the contrary, it can be a way to systematize the findings and think of the further perspectives; the Foundation itself requires not that much information. Bureaucratic procedures are also minimal: one needs two signatures, one from accounting and one from the Rector's office.

and the signatures of the members of the projects. The main source of problems for researchers funded by government funds are bureaucrats in corresponding organizations (universities, research institutes).

State assignment reports are a lot more complicated. In Russia, there is a Government Standard (GOST) for scientific reports. It is very old and makes little sense. This document, GOST 7.32-2001, is 20 pages long, was enacted in its current version in 2002 and is still in effect. It regulates the requirements for the report in minute detail (cover page, abstract, introduction, main part, conclusion, applications etc.). For example, the main part of the report on state assignment must include: reasons for the chosen direction of research; methods of problem-solving and the comparative evaluation thereof; description of the general methodology of the research project; process of theoretical and/or experimental research, including definitions of the nature and content of theoretical research; methods of research; methods of calculation; reasoning for necessity of experiments; operating principles of the objects developed, their characteristics; summary and evaluation of the results of research, including assessment of completeness of solution of the initial problem, evaluation of reliability of results acquired and comparison to the similar research results in Russia and abroad; reasons for further research; negative results serving as reasons for discontinuation of further research. One look at this list can discourage any researcher from doing any innovation whatsoever.

When encouraging innovation activity, the top officials (be it government or corporate) aim for a real economic payoff: a better-working system, an improved quality of services, a boost for scientific and technological progress. These kinds of initiatives are very logical and constitute a part of every manager's gob. He was assigned or elected to make the world a better place, and it is impossible without innovations. Words and actions of the top officials stimulate not only innovative but also bureaucratic activity. In sociology this lateral stimulation is called a "latent function". And sometimes such a latent function becomes more consequential than the original, declarative function.

Innovations accrete special rules, procedures and, most importantly, paperwork. Endless competitions and tenders summon contractors and consultants. And this whole process is virtually impossible without numerous proposals, summaries of expert opinions and the joy of every bureaucrat: reports, reports, reports… E.g. the level of bureaucratization in

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Russian universities has led to significant growth in administrative staff at the expense of faculty, but also to the fact that time spent by faculty members on plans and reports has grown comparable to the time spent teaching or writing a small research paper. The time and effort spent planning and reporting is not accounted for (Babintseva, Murakhovskaya, Serkina Ya., 2014, p.46). According to research by Schipatcheva N. (2012), 54% of university professors asked are "strongly concerned" by the over-regulation of their work, the amount of reports and other kinds of work unrelated to their main duties as researchers or educators. The "Individual Lecturer's Plan" is a good example of this.

One of the most prestigious and innovative universities in Russia, Higher School of Economics (HSE) provides a revealing example: it employs 1853 faculty members and 565 researchers; other university employees are 204 managers, 1201 support staff (mostly charged with teaching methodology duties), 599 administrative and housekeeping staff, 1052 technicians.

Assignation and development of budget resources for innovations provided a natural breeding ground for innovation bureaucracy. The saddest part of the situation is the fact that the bureaucratic control over government and corporate spending is necessary. Obviously, without such control thousands of fake "innovators" would spend the money on their crazy ideas. However, innovation bureaucracy makes use of this situation, grows stronger, and doubles up on paving innovator's way with countless legal documents.

**Conclusion**

Bureaucracy would not be itself if it would not try to rise its own operation budget. Consequently, a significant share of resources allocated for innovations goes to bureaucracy. Today it has secured a new stable financial source, together with an eternal raison d'etre for itself: the bureaucracy claims to care for the right spending, prevent misuse of resources and, in this quality, "help' the innovators.

Innovation bureaucracy constantly invents various instruments to strengthen itself. Occasionally something that was supposed to weaken innovation bureaucracy turns into its powerful weapon of influencing society. So, computers and internet has long been (reasonably) seen as tools to reduce bureaucracy, or at least paperwork. But innovation bureaucracy

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managed to re-tool them for its own purposes. Today banks, non-profit funds, schools, hotels all require hundreds of report forms. Doctors and educators spend more time on filling out digital forms than doing their job. Thus, according to one research, in 80% of schools in Russia imperfections in administrative systems makes teachers work overtime, not only teaching but performing tasks that have nothing to do with their professional duties as teachers (Sheregi, Arefyev, & Tsarkov, 2016).

Indeed, if the amounts of paperwork would have stayed the same, with the new technical facilities to deal with it life would have been much easier, and the amount of time spent dealing with bureaucratic procedures would have been reduced significantly. But bureaucracy adapted to the new circumstances. It started asking for more and more reports and forms, seemingly for the purpose of more rigorous control. Here the ancient motive of all bureaucrats comes into play: they to demonstrate that they are necessary for society. This is the reason why the amounts of paperwork in "paperless" form have grown in geometric progression.

When someone from non-bureaucratic environment asks with indignation why is all this necessary, the answer is usually very stunning: "Why are you so cross, it is so easy to do!" The gist of the answer being that computers and internet make filling out paperwork much easier. But this answer does not take into account that somewhat shorter time spent filling out one form is more than compensated by the geometric growth in the number of forms, so the net time spent on paperwork grows significantly. The intellectual strenuousness of this activity does not go away either, the composition of forms prohibiting direct transfer of data from one document to another.

Therefore, bureaucracy has become a necessary instrument of the large-scale process of innovation quintessential for development of contemporary society. But bureaucracy would not be itself if it could not render this process devoid of content, filling it instead with familiar procedures, finding specific niches fully subject to its bureaucratic rules. In practice, innovation bureaucracy proved itself to be no better or worse than its predecessors.

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