The Role of Neuroaccounting (the Science of Neural-based Accounting) in Decision Making

Authors

  • Tri Frida Suryati Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi (STIE) Muhammadiyah Mamuju, Indonesia
  • William Indra S. Mooduto Universitas Bina Mandiri Gorontalo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18662/brain/12.1/169

Keywords:

Neuroscience, Neuroaccounting, Agency Theory

Abstract

The present study aims to determine the role of neuroaccounting in decision making. The data collection method is conducted by using interviews, moreover, the data analysis is analyzed by administering the interpretation of subjective understanding of informants which then followed by researchers' reflexivity. The results suggest that principal-agent relationships can occur when the legislature and the executive establish agency relationships in the policy-making process. In the perception of neuroscience; the interest of interest, the limited time of office, the inclination and limitation of knowledge to know all the public needs can be imprinted and settled in the brain, thus, it can create moral hazard and adverse selection of behavior.

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Published

2021-03-29

How to Cite

Suryati, T. F. ., & S. Mooduto , W. I. (2021). The Role of Neuroaccounting (the Science of Neural-based Accounting) in Decision Making. BRAIN. Broad Research in Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience, 12(1), 40-50. https://doi.org/10.18662/brain/12.1/169

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