The Role of Neuroaccounting (the Science of Neural-based Accounting) in Decision Making
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18662/brain/12.1/169Keywords:
Neuroscience, Neuroaccounting, Agency TheoryAbstract
The present study aims to determine the role of neuroaccounting in decision making. The data collection method is conducted by using interviews, moreover, the data analysis is analyzed by administering the interpretation of subjective understanding of informants which then followed by researchers' reflexivity. The results suggest that principal-agent relationships can occur when the legislature and the executive establish agency relationships in the policy-making process. In the perception of neuroscience; the interest of interest, the limited time of office, the inclination and limitation of knowledge to know all the public needs can be imprinted and settled in the brain, thus, it can create moral hazard and adverse selection of behavior.
References
Amayah, A. T. (2013). Determinants of knowledge sharing in a public sector organization. Journal of Knowledge Management. https://doi.org/10.1108/JKM-11-2012-0369
Andvig, J. C. (1993). Economic analyses of corruption. Development Theory: Recent Trends. Proc. Conference, Bergen, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0599-9_2
Andvig, Jens Chr, & Moene, K. O. (1990). How corruption may corrupt. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(90)90053-G
Arter, D. (2006). Introduction: Comparing the legislative performance of legislatures. Journal of Legislative Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572330600875423
Austen-Smith, D. (1999). Review of The Democratic Dilemma (Lupia and McCubbins). Public Choice.
Baltrunaite, A., Bello, P., Casarico, A., & Profeta, P. (2014). Gender quotas and the quality of politicians. Journal of Public Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.008
Bar-Gill, O., & Sunstein, C. R. (2015). Regulation as delegation. Journal of Legal Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/lav005
Bozeman, B., Aberbach, J., Putnam, R., & Rockman, B. (1982). Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. https://doi.org/10.2307/3324823
Christensen, C. M. (1992). Exploring the limits of the technology s‐curve. Part I: Component technologies. Production and Operations Management. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.1992.tb00001.x
Colombatto, E. (2003). Why is corruption tolerated? Review of Austrian Economics. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1027349206371
Colombatto, E. (2018). The economic way of thinking. In The Economics You Need. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315658988-2
Della Porta, D., & Vannucci, A. (2012). Political Corruption. In The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444355093.ch12
Feltham, G. A., & Xie, J. (1994). and Diversity in Congruity Principal / Agent Relations. The Accounting Review.
Gagliarducci, S., Nannicini, T., & Naticchioni, P. (2010). Moonlighting politicians. Journal of Public Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.001
Galasso, V., & Nannicini, T. (2011). Competing on good politicians. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055410000535
Hepburn, C. (2010). Environmental policy, government, and the market. Oxford Review of Economic Policy. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grq016
Kim, C.-S., Mauer, D. C., & Sherman, A. E. (1998). The Determinants of Corporate Liquidity: Theory and Evidence. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. https://doi.org/10.2307/2331099
Laver, M., & Shepsle, K. A. (2012). Government Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy. In Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139175104.010
Lupia, A., & Mccubbins, M. D. (1994). Learning from oversight: Fire alarms and police patrols reconstructed. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/10.1.96
Lupia, A., & McCubbins, M. D. (1994). Designing Bureaucratic Accountability. Law and Contemporary Problems. https://doi.org/10.2307/1191988
Lupia, A., & McCubbins, M. D. (2000). Representation or abdication? How citizens use institutions to help delegation succeed. European Journal of Political Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00514
Lupia, A., & McCubbins, M. D. (2012). The Institutional Foundations of Political Competence: How Citizens Learn What They Need to Know. In Elements of Reason. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511805813.003
Lupia, A., McCubbins, M. D., & Popkin, S. L. (2012). Constructing a Theory of Reasoning: Choice, Constraints, and Context. In Elements of Reason. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511805813.013
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1986). Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555714
Nyman, C., Nilsson, F., & Rapp, B. (2005). Accountability in local government: a principal‐agent perspective. Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting. https://doi.org/10.1108/14013380510645397
Powell, R. J. (2007). Executive-legislative relations. In Institutional Change in American Politics: The Case of Term Limits. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1ww3w2t.9
Raczkowski, K. (2015). Public management: Theory and practice. In Public Management: Theory and Practice. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20312-6
Raile, E. D., Pereira, C., & Power, T. J. (2011). The executive toolbox: Building legislative support in a multiparty presidential regime. Political Research Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912909355711
Rockman, B. A. (1984). Legislative-Executive Relations and Legislative Oversight. Legislative Studies Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.2307/439490
Shugart, M. S. (2009). Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548460.003.0018
Street, J. (2004). Celebrity Politicians: Popular Culture and Political Representation. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2004.00149.x
Thatcher, M. (2005). The third force? Independent regulatory agencies and elected politicians in Europe. In Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2005.00280.x
Tommasi, M., & Weinschelbaum, F. (2007). Centralization vs. decentralization: A principal-agent analysis. Journal of Public Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00311.x
Upping, P., & Oliver, J. (2011). International Review of Business Research Papers Accounting Change Model for the Public Sector : Adapting Luder ’ s Model for Developing Countries. International Review of Business Research Papers.
Van Slyke, D. M. (2007). Agents or stewards: Using theory to understand the government-nonprofit social service contracting relationship. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mul012
Whitford, A. B. (2005). The pursuit of political control by multiple principals. Journal of Politics. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00306.x
Ying, H., & Dawei, Z. (2019). Manager’s characteristics, debt financing and firm value. China Economist.
Zucco, C. (2013). Legislative Coalitions in Presidential Systems: The Case of Uruguay. Latin American Politics and Society. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2013.00185.x
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2021 The Authors & LUMEN Publishing House
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:
- Authors retain copyright and grant this journal right of first publication, with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work, with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g. post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g. in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as an earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).
BRAIN. Broad Research in Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience Journal has an Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs
CC BY-NC-ND
