Parsson and Săvulescu's "Unfit for the Future" or the Starting Point for the Deconstruction of the Concept of Parentality

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Abstract: Recent sociological, philosophical, legal and bioethical literature has signaled the current family crisis under the impact of new reproductive technologies, but in this paper we will only focus on four of the most controversial practices: solo reproduction, cloning, artificial embryos, and genetic engineering for non-medical reasons. Starting from the ideas expressed by Ingmar Persson and Julian Săvulescu in the book, "Unfit for the Future. The Need for Moral Enhancement", as well as in a series of works by Julian Săvulescu, which have, as a common ground, the theory developed by him along with Persson in the above mentioned volume, we will argue that in the knowledge-based society, we have reached the point of transition from the postmodern family to a new type of family, in which the content of the concepts of maternity and paternity has changed, so that it has come to a point where principles that have managed to maintain their theoretical stability for more than 2,000 years seem inadequate, as is the case of *mater semper certa est, pater incertus*, which could be more realistically rephrased today by *mater incerta est, pater non est necessarium*.

Keywords: *motherhood; fatherhood; parentality; biomoral enhancement; procreative beneficence; Julian Săvulescu; Ingmar Persson.*

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Introduction

The whole evolution of the human species has, until recently, been governed by family, filiation and reproduction, behaviors that seemed immune to any fundamental, irreversible change, since they were indissolubly linked to our biological determinism (procreation by fertilization of the egg by the sperm in the woman's body, as a result of the sexual relationship between the woman and the man), as well as to our human nature (the necessary time for a newborn to reach adulthood, biologically and psycho-emotionally, as a result of the care invested by parents in transmitting knowledge, skills, and abilities that the child, once he has become a mature individual, will use to successfully resume the procreation cycle, to ensure perpetuation of the species and to be able to prepare his own descendants for parenthood).

Traditionally, the concept of mother meant the identity between the woman who contributed genetically to the formation of the new human being, carried the pregnancy and gave birth, and the married woman, who, after having physical relations with her husband, brought the child into the world, and educated him along with his father, forming together a family. The father, on the other hand, was the mother's husband and, at the same time, the genetic and social parent of the child who was born in marriage. The family was represented by the husband, the wife and their children.

As a result of frequent events affecting family life (the death of one of the spouses, followed by the remarriage of the surviving spouse, caring for orphans by other people than their deceased parents, adultery), traditionally it was accepted that maternity, paternity and family include situations in which the family incorporates members by adoption, caring for the children that the other spouse had from a previous marriage (commonly known as step-parents), respectively, since the time of ancient Roman law, more than 2,000 years ago, it was accepted that a child may have been raised by his mother and recognized by her husband, although in fact he was born as a result of his mother's adultery, which, in family law, has turned into the famous principle *mater semper certa est, pater incertus*.

Under the impact of various ideological trends, the concepts of mother, father and family have undergone multiple changes of content until, in current society, homoparental family structures, single parent families, and other such concepts have emerged, describing specificities of a postmodern society, in which the family, in return, as a micro-social group, has been transformed and readjusted.

On this still unstable background, of controversies raised by social acceptance or non-acceptance, namely the recognition or not, as a consequence, of new family structures (eg, same-sex marriage), emerged new reproductive technologies, some innovative, already available, others with a still futuristic bearing, but likely to be available in the near future, of which in this article we will deal only with some: solo reproduction, cloning, artificial embryos and genetic engineering for non-medical reasons. Next, we intend to establish a series of theoretical axes in order to signal the impact that these new medical technologies have on the resizing the concepts of maternity, paternity and family.

Procreative hypertechnologization - medical techniques that exclude the existence of "Another"

Solo reproduction is the process by which an embryo is created in vitro by fertilizing an ovum with a sperm, mentioning that both reproductive cells come from the same person, whether female or male, and compensation for the missing germ cell (either egg or sperm) is made by genetic engineering, in other words by transforming a male's somatic cell into an ovum or a woman's somatic cell into a sperm (Cutaş, 2014).

This technique is different from parthenogenesis (commonly referred to as cloning) in that this second method of obtaining an embryo does not imply the fertilization of the ovum by a sperm, but actually the creation of the embryo from an unfertilized egg, namely by sampling a nucleus from an adult somatic cell and inserting it into an enucleated ovum (from which the nucleus was extracted), thus creating a zygote (Miehl, 2003).

The creation of "artificial" embryos, in other words by using genetic material obtained from stem cells of other embryos, involves the combination of embryonic stem cells (as they are totipotent, more precisely they have the potential to transform themselves structurally and to perform the functions of any adult cell, including germ cells), with trophoblastic stem cells (which have the potential to form a placenta) (Scutti, 2018). Artificial embryos - obtained by combining stem cells from other embryos, should not be confused with "synthetic embryos" ("Scientist Have Created", n.d.), created through synthetic biology techniques, by which an embryo is formed as a new organism in the absence of any genetic association with a particular person, but by designing new DNA sequences (Synthetic Biology Project, n.d.).

All three of these techniques exclude not just any form of physical relationship between two people, that could lead to the occurrence of a

pregnancy, but the very existence of a partner in the act of procreation. Fertilization occurs in vitro, outside the woman's body, and the pregnancy may be borne by a woman who has requested the creation of the embryo or a surrogate mother, if the woman who created the embryo, for various objective or subjective reasons, can not or does not want to bear the burden of pregnancy, or if the person who requested the creation of the embryo is a man.

Non-medical genetic engineering involves making changes in the genetic structure of an individual when such changes are not necessary in order to treat a disease affecting that individual, but in order to improve a set of features or abilities that would make him more competitive in society or more adaptable to certain situations than other members of society.

The ethical controversies that have led to the possibility of using each of the above mentioned medical procedures are (at least some of them) relatively intuitive, and others are bioethical debates of a particular complexity, as can be seen in the literature (Cohen, 2014; Lipman & Newman, 2005; Taylor, 2005) and as we have explicitly shown in some of our previous works (Huidu, 2017, 2018a, 2018b), but ethical dilemmas are not necessarily the subject of this study, so we will only discuss them to the extent that they will pose an interest in the discussion addressed in this article.

"Unfit for the Future" – A challenge for new social realities

We start our analysis with a few considerations on the well-known work of authors Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu (2012), entitled "Unfit for the Future. The Need for Moral Enhancement" and we show even from the start that, although the work itself does not directly address aspects regarding the social issues raised by new reproductive technologies as far as family life goes, the theory presented in the book is the basis for a series of other works by Julian Savulescu, in which the author fundamentally reshapes the way the social dimension of parenting (as a social obligation of parents to raise and educate children within the family) should be understood in a hypertechnological society.

The authors of the book argue that there is currently a considerable discrepancy between the skills that technology offers humanity to intervene decisively in the development of naturally functioning systems (for the topic approached in this paper, we give the example of the possibility to create human beings through cloning, a technique that is likely to lead to the occurrence of genetically determined anomalies, a risk that is even higher than that in infants born as a result of an incest between close relatives) and

the moral ability of individuals to give up their immediate interests in order to protect the interests of future generations, that this discrepancy is particularly dangerous because it is much easier to destabilize a biological system through unnecessary interventions, and by that doing what the authors call the "Ultimate Harm" (the irreparable destruction of that system), rather than rebalancing the same system after the negative effects of unnecessary external intervention have occurred.

Persson and Săvulescu (2012) assert that in order to ensure an ethical climate within society for the development of innovative technologies with destructive potential (including genetic engineering, which leads to the availability of the other three forms of human assisted reproduction that we have referred to earlier), it is necessary to use genetic moral enhancement and/or with the help of drugs created for this purpose, to ensure a predisposition towards morality for the members of the human species.

The authors base their claims on a number of theories, which can be synthesized as follows: 1. the sense of human responsibility is based on causality; 2. people have a predisposition to safeguard the near future and the persons to whom they feel emotionally linked; 3. individuals tend to favor available memories.

According to the first argument, the responsibility that an individual feels about the evil he creates through his actions or which he lets happen through his omission to act is directly proportional to the rate of contribution the individual perceives he had to the outcome of that evil, therefore, the degree of responsibility felt diminishes accordingly, depending on how big the number of people who contribute to the damaging result is. To exemplify this argument on solo reproduction, we will show that a researcher who acts to make the technique available for human patients, although it is likely he will face a series of moral conflicts due to the fact that the technique can aggravate the problem of instrumentalisation of life and human beings, or the risk of producing genetic mutations in descendants similar to those that would occur between monozygotic twins (Cutaş & Smajor, 2016; Lipman & Newman, 2005), he will feel less responsible if he knows that there are other researchers doing similar research for the same purpose as himself.

The predisposition to safeguard the near future involves what Persson and Săvulescu (2012) call "personal and temporal myopia," namely the tendency of individuals to worry about and implicitly feel responsible for persons who are close to them, with whom they share a strong affective bond, as well as for events that are predictable to occur in the near future or during their lives, and to be indifferent to events that will, in a distant future,

affect future generations of people which they do not know yet (and eventually they will never meet). To exemplify on creating artificial embryos, it is predictable - when we take into consideration human behavior based on this predilection to favor the near future - that someone who has "commissioned" the creation of an embryo from cells taken from other embryos to not feel responsible for the ethically controversial situation that they create because the respective embryos become parents even before they themselves are born, and thus violate both the laws of heredity and the right not to procreate of future individuals (Huidu, 2017).

The issue of available memories implies that individuals will be more tempted to use ethically controversial techniques as they will more effectively imagine the unwanted effect that a certain negative situation will produce in their lives and will tend to resort to extreme solutions in order to ensure that the evil they faced in the past will no longer occur (Persson & Săvulescu, 2012). This time we will resort to an example involving cloning. It is thus possible for a person who has consistently opposed cloning on a principled basis - because it is a technique capable of affecting human rights to individuality and genetic identity and it diminishes specific characteristics of the species by dehumanizing the act of reproduction (Millbank, 2003) -, to accept cloning - assuming that the technique is available - in order to replace the child they already have, but who suffers from an incurable disease that will cause his death in the near future.

Based on these arguments, Julian Săvulescu, together with Ingmar Persson, concludes that moral bio-enhancement of individuals is necessary, so that they are no longer so easily subjected to emotional fluctuations generated by causality, the propensity to favor the near future and the tendency to favor available memories, and thus be exposed to morally dysfunctional decisions that may lead to the Ultimate Harm scenario. Julian Săvulescu leads this conclusion one step further and, while developing the theory presented in the book "Unfit for the future", he also formulates the theory of procreative beneficence (Săvulescu, 2011; Săvulescu & Kahane, 2009).

Procreation beneficence and it's impact on family perception

Essentially, this second theory states that, under the principle of procreative beneficence, there is even a real moral obligation for parents to create children who, from a genetic point of view, have the best chance for the best possible life. With this argument, Săvulescu justifies using genetic engineering in general, not only for the purpose of bio-moral enhancement,

since both types of genetic engineering would increase the quality of life, which is an essential condition of a good life, and therefore, of happiness (Săvulescu, 2016). To those who oppose this theory (Sparrow, 2007), Săvulescu replies, as counter-arguments, that it is wrong to think that there is something wrong in choosing the best context (including genetically) in which an individual can carry out his existence, it is necessary to treat genetic enhancements just like the changes we make to improve the environment in which children are raised and genetic augmentation is a valuable resource, that allows us to do more easily things that matter to us most, in order to achieve a good life (Săvulescu, 2016).

The way this theory has been mentioned and further enriched with nuances in the literature proves the theoretical impact it had on resizing the way in which assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) and techniques related to or derived from ART (such as genetic engineering) affect the perception of the concept of parenthood and the way it changes over time. Julian Săvulescu's theory of procreative beneficence is met theoretically with another equally well-known theory, that of reproductive autonomy formulated by John A. Robertson (1996, 2017), according to which there is a basic biological need to have genetic descendants - showing that it is understandable why people who would have a real option to use innovative reproductive technologies, such as solo reproduction, cloning or creating artificial embryos, would choose to avoid the legal, emotional and medical complications resulting from using gametes from donors, even though all these techniques are all extremely controversial, as they create possibilities, unimaginable until today, for homosexual and lesbian couples to claim a true right to have genetic progeny by using extreme reproductive methods, without giving up the sexual identity they chose.

To support this view on the reproductive rights of members of the LGBD community, Robertson has - since 1983 - argued that satisfying reproductive interests of certain individuals might depend on the fact that the future child presents certain genetic features (which can be obtained, for example, by cloning), thus the principle of procreative freedom also justifies non-medical genetic engineering, and the only limitation should be the risk of inducing traits that would cause a serious harm to the individual's life (for example, an incurable genetic malformation) that, for him, would make non-existence preferable to existence.

Other authors formulate their own theories that adhere to the conceptual framework elaborated by the procreative beneficence and reproductive autonomy theories. One of the most widely discussed is "the non-identity problem", formulated by Parfit (1984), according to which the

autonomy of the future child is not violated if genetic engineering causes him no harm, because his creation is preferable to non-existence, as long as genetic improvement provides him with a life worth living. Cohen (2014) also draws attention to the fact that the only relevant comparison is between existence and non-existence, namely whether the future child would have preferred not to exist at all, rather than to exist in his improved version (or, to extrapolate for this paper, given that the techniques we refer to are, in the end, particular forms of genetic engineering, in his cloned, self-fertilized or artificial version).

We will notice that, even from a chronological perspective, the theory of procreative beneficence, the theory of reproductive autonomy and the non-identity problem (which we consider to be the most relevant theories on the impact of innovative reproductive technologies on family life - although it is worth mentioning that, besides these theories, there is a considerable amount of points of view, positions, arguments, and even emerging theories that all converge to similar conclusions) have been elaborated roughly over the same period of time and in some points are even complementary. This trend in literature, based on the study and observation of social behaviors, reflects the fact that in present society, there is a tendency to recontextualize what people perceive as being part of the semantic area of the concepts of maternity and paternity, as we will argue next.

From mater semper certa est, pater incertus, to mater incerta est, pater non est necessarium

In a consumerist, competitive, globalized, active, liberal society, the traditional meaning of the concepts "mother", "father", and "family" was no longer satisfactory for "giving meaning to the world" (Derrida, 1998) in the case of a significant number of individuals, whose social behaviors conflicted with the metanarrations that sustained the theoretical framework that offered legitimacy, beyond the trust gained through temporal sustainability, to the traditional family - which had until then been regarded as an optimal formula for satisfying the need (at the same time psychological and social) of the members of society to live with a stable partner and have descendants. This is the point beyond which theoretical deconstruction (according to the Derridian model) of the traditional concepts begins, which at a social level was translated into adopting different lifestyles, detached from the classical one, viewed as an alternative to moral restrictions that did not match anymore the dynamics of a social life in which individual needs began to

surpass the desire for social validation, which had until then kept social conformism away from straying, which was considered an exception. These are correlated with adopting alternatives to traditional family structures and functions, alternatives marked by resizing family values, which are now a subject to other rules: increased freedom, balancing efforts of both spouses in all aspects of life, a democratic relation between partners (Popescu, 2009).

This is how the transition to the postmodern family happened, where, regarding in-marital relations, family, as a social construct, is no longer indissolubly linked to marriage between the man and the woman, but to their cohabitation according to the standards of intimacy in conjugality (Apostu & Turluc, 2017), even in the absence of an official, formal, conventional relation, and because society accepted the idea of marriage without marriage, there was a new drift, this time towards accepting the idea of intimacy - similar to conjugality - between same-sex persons, then the notions were overlapped, altered as such (or enriched with these new meanings) over the notion of marriage, thus giving a new dimension to the concept of family, now referred to also as "family", but with the heterosexual or homosexual adagio, as the case may be.

A series of other characteristics (which are of interest in the present paper, as they contribute to changing the content of the concept of parenthood) of the postmodern family identified in the literature (Apostu, 2016) emphasize on the fact that relationships within the family are marked by changing roles (for example, women become career-oriented, a role traditionally assumed by men, the notion of paternity leave is introduced, as an abandonment of a classical role attributed until then exclusively to the woman/mother etc.), but not necessarily by changing social status (which most of the times tends to maintain the traditional facade), by changing the view on the process of procreation (where marriage is no longer seen as an essential moral requirement for bringing a child into the world in conditions of social acceptability), or on the way children are raised and educated (accepting so-called single-parent families as a viable alternative to two-parent families, but not due to fatal causes such as death of one parent, but as a result of the conscious choice of a person to assume the single-parent role).

Even under these conditions, the acceptance of new social realities of family life was not and is not unanimous, even within societies characterized by a high degree of ideological and political homogeneity, observing that within the same social group both trends are present: traditional and postmodern (Apostu, 2013). This ideological duality is also maintained legally, because, while recognizing the single-parent family in the

case of adoption performed by a single, unmarried person (based on a certificate that the person is capable to adopt, released under the conditions of Law no. 273/2004 on the adoption procedure), the Civil Code still preserves the presumption that the husband of the mother is the father of the child born during marriage (article 414), which applies even when the mother has undergone in vitro fertilization with donor sperm (until the court rule on a possible request on denial of paternity) and which, because the law does not distinguish, as it is not in tune with new reproductive realities, would still be applicable even in cases of cloning (although cloning is a form of asexual reproduction that excludes participation of a partner in the act of procreation, and in this case we do not see who else could be the plaintiff or the defendant in litigation, since both of them are the same person and, according to the rules of civil procedure, only one person can not cumulate both qualities). In some cases (such as, for example, homosexual marriages), a clear legislative direction is avoided, and social reactions to the concept are sufficiently effervescent to conclude that the social consensus threshold has not yet been reached, so instead of "marriage", the notion of "freely consented union" or derivatives are used, but which are essentially charged, by those who use these terms to express emotional stability and monogamy, with the same meaning as the concept of "family".

On this background- marked by controversies and affirmations of one theory or another - emerging extreme reproductive technologies that suddenly uproot family from the postmodern paradigm - as the nearest ideological paradigm for the existing social behaviors -, place it in a context in which operational notions become more and more sinuous and fluid. We say "fluid" because they are marked by rapid technological progress in everyday life and also in the most delicate plane of human existence (family), which implicitly generates a crisis of the concepts that people use to define reality.

Indeed, from a postmodern society based on ideologies, we face a fast-paced transition to a hypertechnologized society, in which the social negotiation of reality, which was to complement, as a process, the postmodern dialectical deconstruction of metanarrations, is not rapid enough compared to the pace of technological evolution (Sandu, 2015). Thus, the sudden gap that emerges between scientific progress, including in terms of human medical reproductive techniques, and the changes it produces, which society, before accepting, needs to understand, internalize, test, and experience, marks the society's ability to adapt. And it seems that this time, not those who want to strain away from the socially accepted behavioral model have to adapt to social requirements, but society is forced to adapt to

the choices made by some of its members, not in a very large number, but whose options, as Persson and Săvulescu (2012) argued, are likely to unbalance the entire functioning of the system.

If postmodernity brought along a deconstruction of concepts, in the transmodern knowledge-based society we witness a true dissolution of concepts, and we will exemplify this dissolution as follows: it is not for the first time that new concepts are used to name realities and in order to illustrate this we will bring attention to the notions of "step-father" and "step-mother", "adoptive father" and "adoptive mother" and emphasize the balance that accompanied the addition of "step" and "adoptive" alongside the "mother" and "father" concepts. Naturally, this linguistic addition leads to an adrift of the content that is loaded into the notions of "father" and "mother", but the balance used to be maintained, however, in the case of the larger concept of "parentality", which is no longer the case of new reproductive technologies, that separate the biological role of paternity and maternity from their social role and also the genetic role of women in perpetuating the species from their gestational role (Huidu, 2017).

Thus, we witness the emergence of concepts like "genetic parents" instead of "parents", that are used to separate parents who sum up all three roles (genetic, gestational and social) by persons who only supply the genetic material for the creation of embryos, or "surrogate motherhood", which refers exclusively to the gestational aspect of maternity, as long as the "genetic mother" in this case may be another woman, and the "social mother" a third one. As a correlation, there is no longer any balance of language. Although there may be a "genetic father" and a "social father," there is no "surrogate father", and it is hard to imagine what content we could load into the notion of "surrogate fatherhood." Since the interpretative adrift of the notions of "father" and "mother" has taken place over time, little by little, we hardly realize how great the distance is between the traditional concept of "mother" (as we defined it in the introduction to this article - the woman who brought the genetic contribution genetically shape the new human being, carried the pregnancy and gave birth, which was the same as the married woman who, following physical relations with her husband, brought a child into the world, grew up and educated that child along with her husband) and the concept of "surrogate mother", who is the pregnant woman, artificially inseminated with an embryo to whom she has no genetic link, and who, after birth occurs, has no connection with and no obligation to the child who was born.

It is what Antonio Sandu (2015) calls fractal reconstruction of concepts in the knowledge-based transmodern society. In other words, the

conceptual reconstruction of notions is no longer done harmoniously, in an integrative manner, but divided, fractured, and when the conceptual unity is lost, when this unity can no longer be recovered through a reconstruction process, we are no longer in the presence of deconstruction, but a actual dissolution of the notion of parentality towards something undefined. Although, it can be argued at the same time that, as Eco (2017) shows, there is a predisposition of notions and concepts to an unlimited semiosis, and the hermeneutical ability of a notion to move from one meaning to another is favored by the chain of similarities that a set of notions have with each other, as described by Bambrough (1961), who considers that if a concept is analyzed in terms of its properties, and this concept will share some of these properties with another, then an interpretive adrift will occur and the concept will change its content. Likewise, this concept, once modified, if the process of conceptual contagion based on common properties with a new concept is resumed, this drift can be maintained indefinitely.

In the case of in vitro fertilization and, in general, collaborative reproduction (in which the act of procreation involves two or more persons), the use of the concept of parentality can still considered appropriate. We can even accept that, in the absence of a more adequate term and to avoid the notions of "mother" and "father", which may seem inconvenient or even uncomfortable for members of LGBD communities, the concept of "parentality" can be extended sufficiently to include the situation when the act of reproduction no longer involves exclusively the collaboration between a man and a woman, but the collaboration between two women and a man (if in the ovum fertilized with the sperm of the man genetic material from the second woman is introduced, so that both members of the lesbian couple have a genetic link with the child to be born) or two men and a woman (if the embryo is created from genetic material of the woman who supplies the ovum, which is fertilized by a sperm belonging to one of the genetic "fathers" and genetic material is introduced from the second "father," when the two "fathers" are "spouses" in a homosexual family, legally or just socially recongnized).

Returning to Bambrough's (1961) theory of conceptual contagion based on common properties, we ask the question, however, whether unlimited interpretative adrift is possible when the two concepts, while having common elements, are at the same time contradictory. We believe that in the case of solo reproduction and cloning the adrift can not be unlimited, no matter how much we try to assimilate the new realities in the already existing concepts, because these concepts can no longer semantically support current realities. When solo reproduction is concerned, the parent

will at the same time be the mother and father of the child to be born, and in the case of cloning, the parent will at the same time be the mother/father and the brother/sister (the genetic status will be that of monozygotic twins) which, although technologically possible to overlap, can not be overlapped semantically, just as they can not be overlapped behaviorally or socially.

The elements that they have in common (such as genetic kinship, parental care towards the newborn etc.) can not, however, justify an acceptable overlap. And if we can accept an interpretive adrift from *mater semper certa est* (the mother is always certain, known) to *mater incerta est* (mother is not always certain - if we take into consideration surrogate motherhood), it is much harder to accept the idea of unlimited interpretive adrift from *pater incertus* (the father is not always certain - for example, if the woman commits an adultery, unknown to her husband, before the child's birth, so another man is the child's father) to *pater non est necessarium* (the father is not necessary - in the case of cloning or solo reproduction).

We therefore return to the idea that the concept of parentality is not, under the effect of extreme reproductive techniques, the subject of a deconstruction, but of a genuine dissolution, since we do not see what name we could give to the concept that synthesizes all the terminological problems specific creating of a form life by cloning, for example. Parthenogenesis (cloning) is essentially a form of asexual reproduction, because it occurs in the absence of fertilization. In the case of asexual reproduction, which occurs naturally in biologically primitive forms of life (protozoa, sponges and coelenterata), parthenogenesis involves the emergence of a longitudinal groove that divides the cell (organism) into two identical parts (Mihai, 2015), and it can not be claimed that any of these newly created parts of bodies/bodies would be the parent of the other. So, in the case of cloning, the notion of parentality has no connection - biologically and scientific - with the medical process itself.

Assuming that we leave this argument aside for a while, no matter what we call the provider of the genetic material, mother, father, twin brother or twin sister of the child to be born (although assigning him/her the quality of the brother/sister would be contrary to the status perceived by the genetic material supplier, who wants to be looked upon as a parent), none of the concepts seem appropriate and at the same time all fit simultaneously, but there is no concept to embody them harmoniously and no one risked to recommend one. In order for the content of a notion to deviate towards the content of another notion, so as to have an interpretative adrift, it is necessary to be able to name that the notion to

which it tends to drift, otherwise the adrift does not occur anymore, and what happens is, in fact, a conceptual dissolution.

The closest concepts which could be used to describe the type of parentality involved in parthenogenesis, could be homoparentality or monoparentality, assumed socially once family its postmodern age. Although these seem to be the most innovative concepts we have, they obviously are not enough. Homoparentality implies the existence of two social parents (possibly also genetic) of the same sex, and monoparentality involves reproduction by collaboration, and we have just established that parthenogenesis is an asexual form of reproduction, therefore it excludes collaboration.

In case of solo reproduction, the notion of "parentality" again seems inappropriate. The technique involves non-collaborative reproduction. It is done unilaterally, with one self. When this happens in nature, because the body has sex organs of both sexes, the term used is "hermaphroditism", which occurs frequently in plants, snails, worms and some fish species, but is not found in biologically evolved organisms ("Despre hermafroditism", 2010). When the ability of an organism to reproduce with itself is the result of genetic engineering, we may discuss, perhaps, and to maintain a correct biologic discourse, about an "induced hermaphroditism", but we believe that such a concept - to define the relationship between the genitor and the child to be born as a result of solo reproduction - would be profoundly offensive to most "parents".

Again, there is a lack of concepts, thus a blockage of the interpretive adrift. Therefore, of course, the question arises about how we can define this new form of family and to what ideological trend it belongs to? Since major changes primarily affect the biological role of the family and less its social and educational role, we consider that we can call it a family, even if it is made up of only one adult who takes care of the child that is born, but we avoid to use any term that would include the concept of parentality, although the idea of a single adult would point us to the notion of a single parent family (but, as we have seen above, both in cloning and solo reproduction, the genitors are not just parents or are not parents per se).

„Neadaptati pentru viitor” both morally, and conceptually

We now return to Persson and Săvulescu's book (2012) and to the reasons why the authors support bio-moral enhancement, and we show that, ultimately, the goal of harmonizing concepts with human actions is to achieve consensus and social harmony, which is why we agree with the

authors when they say that people are not "morally equipped" with enough "weapons" to make decisions that converge towards social harmony, as well as with the arguments they used to reach this conclusion. We refer to the theory of big loss aversion of Kahneman and Tversky (2000), encompassed by Persson and Săvulescu (2012) into their own theories of predisposition to safeguard the near future/persons and tendency to favor available memories.

Thus, big loss aversion, which can essentially be summed up by the fact that losses weigh heavier than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000), is activated when people are in a position to access available memories, more precisely when they themselves or people close to them face a danger (as an example, the state of infertility, which makes them unable to have children) that they have not met before, and therefore have not faced yet, can not imagine the consequences of that danger and, as a consequence, did not yet acquire an aversion towards that danger. The triggering mechanism is that emotions will be all the more powerful as what the person imagines will be more intense, and the loss aversion will increase disproportionately, by reference to the correlative increase of the magnitude of the loss (maintaining the given example, as in vitro fertilization cycles will not result in a successful pregnancy, the aversion of infertile people to the potential of never having children will increase disproportionately).

This is, we say, the reason why, when we are in a situation of making an ethical assessment of a situation (such as the opportunity of cloning), people tend to think, at a principled level, that the situation is unacceptable to them - whereas, as Persson and Săvulescu (2012) assert, before confronting the specter of their own loss, individuals can not sufficiently imagine the experience of that loss so as to empathize with the hypothetical situation, and this moral inability, generated by the priority given to available memories, is likely to lead to fluctuations in their behavior, even if the reasons for the ethical acceptability or unacceptability of a particular situation remain the same irrespective of of one person or another perception.

With regard to researchers who develop such technologies without raising serious ethical issues, we believe that a possible explanation lies also in the combination that is taking place between favoring the near future and expected utility (which in Kahneman and Tversky's work from 2000 was called the "prospect theory"), in other words, they know that the medical technique they develop is morally controversial and risky from a medical point of view (see solo reproduction and the likely risk of genetic mutations in embryos), but given that the technique is still incompletely developed and its negative impact may occur in a distant future, it is easy to ignore moral

dilemmas, especially since the expected utility of the desired scientific success is very important and can also be extremely beneficial (for other alternative applications, not necessarily in reproductive medicine).

On a principled basis, the big gain attraction (which is the opposite of big loss aversion) that a stranger might have, with whom the person who conducts the ethical reflection has no emotional connection, is not in a position to change the level of acceptability of that person, because the person who is attracted by big gains is a foreigner, so the level of empathy is low and the person who conducts the ethical reflection will tend to give priority to moral principles. But when the context changes and those persons become emotionally involved, their own aversion to big losses will make them sensitive to the needs of those close to them, hence they will increase their impulse to accept social behaviors (in our case, reproductive) which previously seemed totally unacceptable, and if they themselves are placed in the potentially harming situation (they are at risk of being unable to have children), it is very likely that they will accept the procedure without reservations.

We believe that this is just the time when the individual is willing to accept a very high degree of risk, even in the face of a low potential for success, when responsibility for society, humanity or future generations disappears, and this is the time when individuals start to look for moral excuses to overcome the ethical conflict that appears between what they truly believe at a principled level and what, contrary to what they believe, are willing to do in order to remove the spectrum of prejudice that stirs their aversion. We therefore consider that, at least in part, what is apparently an interpretative adrift of the notions of "mother", "father" and "family", from their traditional meaning to "surrogate mother", "genitor", "homoparentality" etc., is in fact a way of alleviating the ethical conflict that we are discussing, given that accepting ethically controversial behavior does not, in most cases, come from a real, internalized conviction of that person that the principles he initially adhered to were wrong, but from the need to solve a problem, which is why people seek for anchors - whether they are only at the level of notions, of language - between their actions and the ethical system they had previously adhered to and which, as we were saying, they still do not completely despise.

Linking to a traditional or even non-traditional concept, but benefiting from a high degree of social acceptance, can be a formula of psychological coping. In practice, it is possible that, in strictly ethical terms, the level of acceptability of the individual does not change, but in reality what rises his/her acceptability level is the psychological mechanism of

seeking justifications for overcoming the "moral" suffering generated by the contradiction between what the person believes (ethical convictions) and what the person does (the use of extreme reproductive techniques).

Instead of conclusions

Because of the above mentioned reasoning, we can understand and appreciate the arguments put forward by Persson and Săvulescu (2012) in support of the bio-moral enhancement theory, as it is risky to leave the regulation of ethical mechanisms to analyze technology - a field in which Julian Săvulescu (2015) distinguishes himself as an ambassador for increasing social awareness of the need to adopt ethical matrices to assess the opportunity for the development of certain technologies - to the free appreciation of people who are driven by emotion or anxiety about loss. Under the conditions of the dissolution of the concept of parentality, under the influence of extreme reproductive technologies and the difficulty of replacing it with a more semantic equivalent concept, the balance that the theory of Ingmar Persson and Julian Săvulescu could bring in the regulation of conceptually flawed social mechanisms, even in the absence of a proper practical opportunity for bio-moral enhancement, proves its theoretical utility as a model and desideratum.

We recall the metaphorical but so suggestive manner in which Derrida (1998) explains the need of the members of society to build concepts that embrace the very meaning of their existence: "to give meaning to the world." Although at an early stage of experimentation, the practice of bio-moral enhancement proposed by the two authors, even fiercely criticized by some researchers (Fenton, 2010), may be a hypothetical solution to the ethical dilemmas that blur the meaning of life, the dilemmas involved in cloning, solo reproduction, artificial embryos, and non-medical genetic engineering, to the extent that it correlates with an effective ethical matrix for the assessment of innovative reproductive technologies.

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